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The sole issue rai.sed by Vulcan's appeal from the Di,s... 
trict Court's Order of Pamal Summary Judgment dated 
February 24, 1969, is whether the Districit Court iwas cor-
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rect in ruling thait the Agreement of April 12, 1965, im-
posed upon Vulcan a duty to redeem Mr. Markosian's shares 
of the capitaJI stock of Vulcan. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On April 29, 1968, respondent Markosian filed his 
Complaint in the Third District Court, being docketed as 
Civil Action No. 179219 (R., pp. lb-6b), seeking in the 
second count thereof specific performance of the redemp-
tion agreement contained in a certain Agreement dated 
April 12, 1965, by and between Mr. Markosian and Mr. J. 
Dean Gerstner, which Agreement was adopted and ratified 
by Vulcan. Upon Vulcan's answer (R., pp. llb-13b) the 
claim came to issue. 
Two other civil actions involving the same parties were 
consolidated for trial with No. 179219. However, the issues 
raised by this apperul involve only the second count of No. 
179219. 
Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(R., pp. 112-113), seeking a determination that the April 
12 Agreement required Vulcan to redeem, was argued by 
counsel before District Judge Bryant H. Croft on February 
13, 1969. Thereafter, Judge Croft filed his memorandum 
decision (R., pp. 131-1'34) and the Districit Court's Order 
of Partial Summary Judgment (R., pp. 136-137) was en-
tered. That order constituted a declaration that the April 
12 Agreement imposes a duty upon Vulcan to redeem Mr. 
Markosian's stock, at a price to be determined, and that 
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Mr. Markosian is the owner of at least 200 shares of Vul-
can'.s stock. Other issues raised by the parties' motions, 
'heard at the same time, were left for determination at 
trial. On April 21, 1969, this Court granted an interlocu-
tory appeal (R., p. 165) to review the District Court's 
order. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
By the Complaint and Answer in No. 179219 it is es-
tablished that Vulcan is a Utah corporation engaged in 
steel fabricating in Salit Lake City, that respondent was 
until January 23, 1968, employed as Vice-President and 
General Manager of Vulcan; that under date of April 12, 
1965, respondent and J. Dean Gerstner entered into a cer-
tain Agreement (R., pp. 6-14), which was ratified and 
adopted by Vulcan. The material terms of that Agreement 
are set forth in detail below. The entire Agreement i·s set 
forth 1in the appendix !to this bri.ef aJt pages ri-:id. 
It is also undisputed, as appellant admits in its brief 
(page 3) , that respondent subscribed to and paid for at 
least 200 shares of Vulcan's capital stock. It is also undi·s-
puted that respondent by a letter dated January 23, 1968, 
terminated his employment by Vulcan and demanded the 
redemption of his ,gtock in accordance with the terms of 
the April 12 Agreement, which demand has been refused 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5). 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTERPRETED AS A WHOLE, THE APRIL 
12 AGREEMENT CLEARLY MEANS WHAT 
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THE DISTRICT COURT DETERMINED IT TO 
MEAN. 
A. The Agreement Should be Interpreted as a 
Whole In Light of the Obvious Hazards to 
Minority Shareholders The Agreement Was 
Designed to A void. 
This case presents the classic case of a 51 % owner of 
a closely held corporation attempting to "squeeze out" the ' 
49% owner. As every experienced laWYer knows minority 
shareholders in close corporations are, unless they had 1 
the foresight to insist upon a buy-sell agreement or some 
like arrangement, at the complete mercy of the majority 
owner. 
The inability of holders of minority interests in 
small corporations rto dispose of their interest with-
out serious financial loss undoubtedly prolongs dis-
sension in many instances and encourages ,squeeze-
plays. In a large public-issue corporation, a share-
holder who is dissatisfied with the way the business 
is being operated can sell his stock at no great fi-
nancial loss. That "way out" is not available to a 
shareholder in a close corporntion. Anything less 
than a controlling interest in a close corporation 1 
does not have a ready market; and, if there is dis-
sension in the corporation, a minority interest is 
likely to appear even less inviting to a prospectin: 
purchaser. Further, if there are restrictions on the 
'transferability of shares, as is now often the case, 
an obstinate associate may be in a position to di5-
courage sale of the shares even if a willing pur-
chaser is found. A minority interest in a close cor- ' 
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poration usually cannot even be pledged to obtain 
funds, because banks and other financfal institu-
tions will not accept i,t as collateral 
Often the only prospeotive buyers of a minority 
interest in a small corporation are the majority 
shareholders. Thus the temptation is great for the 
majority shareholders Ito apply a .squeeze. The 
minority ,ghareholder cannot sell out and turn the 
fight over to persons with greater business knowl-
edge or stronger financial resources. 
O'Neal & Derwin, Expulson or Oppression of Busi-
ness Associates (1961), p. 31. 
The sophisticated person who invests in a minority 
share of a close corporation is well aware of the danger of 
being "locked in" as well as the many devious methods the 
majority owners can use to squeeze him out of participa-
tion in profits iwhile enjoying the benefit of the minority 
investment. The best defense against such an unscrupulous 
appropriation of the minority's investment is a buy-sell 
agreement between ithe shareholders designed to aHow the 
minority investor to recoup his investment. 
B. Recital D of the Agreement Clearly Expresses 
the Shareholder's Intent that the Minority 
Owner, Respondent, Be Protected From an 
Appropriation of His Investment. 
The parlbies addressed themselves directly rto .the well-
known hazards of minority shareholders, clearly stating 
that it was their intent, by the contract, to remove this 
hazard. 
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The AprH 12 Agreement sets forth in its recitals the 
two principal purposes of the Agreement (R., 6). Recital 
C 1is to the effect that Gerstner and Marlwsian wished to 
engage in the 'Steel fabricating business in the name of 
Vulcan. Recital D reads as follows: 
Gerstner and Markosian wish to be assured of a 
market at a fair price for their shares of .stock in 
Vulcan ... in the event their interest in (Vulcan) 
is terminated for any reason. (Emphasis supplied.) 
This language, conveniently ignored by Appellant. 
could not be clearer. 'The parties intended that neither 1 
could squeeze the other out or lock into the corporation the 
investment of the other. Yet by ignoring this express lan-
guage as well as the detailed provisions de.signed to cany 
it out, Appellant is attempting the very appropriation 
specifically provided against. 
C. Paragraph 3 Carries Out the Intent of Re-
cital D By Providing That Either Shareholder 
May Offer His Shares To Vulcan and By 
Requiring Vulcan to Purchase Any Shares 
Offered at Their Fair Price. 
Appellant in its Brief only considers a few words of 
the Agreement, ·out of context, failing to bring to the 
Court' attention other important provisions. When con· 
sidered in its entirety tthe Agreement, and especially par3· 
graph 3, obviously required Vulcan to purchase Markosian's 
shares whenever Markosian wished to dispose of them. 
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Paragraph 3 creates the rights and obligations of the 
shareholders :in every major contingency in which a trans-
fer of shares may occur. It is a comprehensive plan, re-
quiring, in all but two instances, lthat Vulcan purchase or 
redeem shares sought to be transferred. 
The only two types of transfers to which 'these require-
ments do not attach are - (a) by gift to a family member 
in which case rthe donee takes the stock subject to the same 
limitations as the donor (R., pp. 8-9) and (b) by a joint 
transfer by both Markosian and Gerstner of all of their 
interest, resulting in corporate liquidation (R., page 12). * 
The provisions of paragraph 3 have two results. The 
first is to prevenlt a stranger from becoming associa;ted 
without consent of all. The second is to provide that either 
party wishing ·to get out will receive a fair price for his 
shares, either from the corporaJtion or from the remaining 
shareholder. 
The key provisions applicable to this case are sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) (R., pp. 9-10). Subparagraph 
(b) concerns inter vivos transfers to nonfamily members. 
Thus if either Gerstner or Markosian desire .to transfer 
their shares to a stranger he must first obtain "written 
consent of all other stockholders" and "in the absence of 
*In neither of these situations is "fair price" a consideration. A 
gift to a family member by definition does not call for any price. A 
ioint transfer by both shareholders resulting in liquidation assures 
equitable division of the value of the assets. 
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desiring to . . . dispose of his . . . stock, .. . . shall give to 
[Vulcan] and to the other stockholders wri1tten notice of 
his . . . intention . .. . contruin [ ing] an off er to sell . . . in 
accordance with the terms of this agreement" Vulcan is 
given 30 days from receipt of such notice to purchase at 
1Jhe formula price and if Vulcan "shall fail or refuse to 
purchase such stock within the time herein provided" then 
the .stockholder is free to make such transfer as he may 
desire. 
The object of this provision is to prevent transfers to 
strangers wi,thouit first obtaining unanimous consent or 
allowing Vulcan to purchase. The other side of the coin 
is subparagraph 3(c) which requires Vulcan to purchase 
from any shareholder who gives the written notice pro-
vided for in ( b) . Thus in ( c) it is provided "it shall be 
mandatory for Corporation to purchase all of the stock .. . 
of any shareholder giving notice as herein provided .... " 
'J:\hat this must be what the provision requires is ob-
vious not only from Recital D, but also from the subpara-
graph heading - "Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock 
Offered" (Emphasis supplied). The duty to purchase does 
nolt arise s1olely upon "terminaltion of employment"; it al-
ternatively arises whenever a shareholder gives due written 
notice. The provisi:ion of (b) permitting a shareholder to 
make a free sale in the event Vulcan shall "fail or refuse" 
(language of breach of duty, not of option) to purchase 
does not raise a contrary implication. SuCJh a failure or 
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refusal on Vulcan's part merely gives the shareholder a 
chance to pursue an alternative remedy or mitigate his 
damages. 
To complete the plan of paragraph 3 in subparagraph 
(f) (R., pp. 12-13), it 'is provided that upon the death of 
any shareholder the decedent's stock shaH be offered oo 
Vulcan and "such stock shall be redeeemed or purchased." 
This paragraph provides in detail for each major con-
tingency of .transfer, providing in each such contingency 
that the corporation must purchase from ·the offering share-
holder. Such a contract is specifically enforceable. John-
son v. Johnson, 87 Colo. 207, 286 P. 109 (1930) ;Bohnsack 
v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N. W. 367 (1940); 
Smith v. Bramwell, 146 Ore. 611, 31 ·P. 2d 647 (1934); 
Claire v. Wigdor, 24 App. Div. 2d 992, 266 N. Y. S. 2d 6 
(1965). 
Read as a whole, in light of the int.enrt manifested in 
RecitaI D, paragraph 3 requires Vulcan to purchase Mar-
kosian's shares at their fair market value. Any other in-
terpretation would disregard the obligatory language of 
paragraph 3, fly in the face of the parties' clearly expressed 
intent, and leave minority slhareholders at the mercy of a 
possibly rapacious majority owner. 
II. THE PHRASE "BY CORPORATION" IN 
SUBPARAGRAPH 3(c) MODIFIES "EMPLOY-
MENT" GIVING RISE TO A DUTY TO PUR-
CHASE UPON TERMINATION OF EMPLOY-
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MENT EFFECTED BY EITHER PARTY FOR 
ANY REASON. 
A. Appellant's Argument that "by Corporation" 
Means "by the Corporation" Merely States 
the Obvious and Fails to Consider the Im-
portant Question Whether "by Corporation" 
Modifies "Employment" or "Termination," 
the Only Two Possibilities. 
1. Appellant conveniently ignores a parallel provision ' 
(which is not contended to have been drafrted by respon-
dent's counsel) found in subparagraph 3 (e) (R., page 12). 
That paragraph uses almost exactly 'the same language as 
found in ~mbparagraph 3 ( c) . "In the event both Markosian ' 
and Gerstner 1wish to terminate their employment by Cor· 
poration, and desire to have Corporation purchase their 
stock, the parties hereto agree to vote their stock for the 
liquidation and dissolution of Corporation [emphasis sup· 
plied]." In that quoted clause the phrooe "by Corporation" 
follows lthe word "employment," as it does in clause 3(c), 
and can only modify "employment," not "terminate." Where 
the language used in two separate clauses is so closely par· 
allel, it is natural to suppose that the parties intended the 
meaning to be parallel. 
2. As was poinlted out to the district court, the phrase 
"termination of employment" has been held to mean ter· 
mination by either employee or employer. Hudson County 1 
Newspaper Guild, Local 42 v. Jersey Publ. Co., 23 N. J. 
Super. 419, 93 A. 2d 183 (App. Div. 1952), holds that the 
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phrase meant "all types of severance, including 'dismissals' 
and 'discharges' and voluntary severance at the instance of 
the employee." "'Termination' is defined as 'endring' or 
'concluding' and, when applied to employment, implies 
either a voluntary quitting by the employee or a discharge 
by the emp'1oyer." Burns v. Stento, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 736, 742 
(1939). See aloo Lineberger v. Security Life & Tr. Co., 
245 N. C. 166, 95 S. E. 2d 501 (1956); Foltz v. Struxness, 
168 Kans. 714, 215 P. 2d 133, 136 (1950). 
B. The Phrase "Termination of Employment by 
Corporation" Should Not be Read in Isolation. 
1. Not only is 3 ( c) part of a comprehensive provision 
designed to assure a fair price for shareholders, but other 
language found within 3 ( c) itself impels the interpretation 
given by the district court. The clause refers to "termina-
tion ... for any reason" [emphasis supplied]. Some mean-
ing must be given this language and the obvious meaning 
is that it means in any circumstance, because of any cause, 
whether the Corporation's or Markosian's. 
2. Conveniently ignored in Appellant's Brief is the 
second part of subparagraph 3 ( c), which reads: "it shall 
be mandatory for Corporation to purchase all of the stock 
of Markosian or Gerstner, or any stockholder ... giving 
written notice as herein provided of hi.s ... intention to 
dispose of hi.s . . . stock." [Emphasis supplied.] The em-
phasized portion of this provision explicitly provides that 
any shareholder (such as Markosian) can upon notice re-
quire Vulcan to purchase, at the fair market value. It is 
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conceded that respondent gave such nortice, and having done 
so he clearly comes within this provision and purchase by 
Vulcan becomes mandaitory. 
3. "Termination" is defined in Webster's Unabridged 
International Dictionary, 2d Edition, to mean "Act ofter-
minating, or of limiting, .... act of ending or concluding." 
As the verb "terminate," it is both itransitive or intransi-
tive. Thus, to "terminate employment" (intransitive) 
means to come to an end. The meaning ascribed by the 
distri0t coui:it is correct grammatically as well as one which 
makes sense. 
4. Appellant would have the Court interpret clause 
3 ( c) so as Ito result in Markosian's loss of his investment. 
Appellant says purchruse by Vulcan turns on :whether Mar-
kosian quit or was fired. Such an interprefation would 
permi1t a corporation to refrain from firing any minority 
shareholder while at the same time making life so difficult 
for the shareholder thaJt simple human dignity impels him 
to quit. Such an interpretation would force the courts to 
examine the uncertain question whether the shareholder 
quit, was forced to quilt (therefore being equivalent to be-
ing fired) or was fired .. The Agreement was designed to 
avoid putting ,the shareholders to the Hoooon's choice of 
quitting, and sacrificing their investment, or staying on 
the job, and sacrificing their self-respeclt. Appellant's in-
terpretation would make a nullity of Recital D and the 
express provisions of paragraph 3. 
III. THE QUESTION OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) 
IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT. 
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At pages 12-14 of its brief appellant makes much of 
the supposed prejudice done Vulcan by the ruling below. 
Appellant says the purchase is at a premium - but no-
where does tthe record support this. All 1the Agreement pro-
vides is that if parties do not agree to a sales price on an 
annual basis, then the sales price shall be determined by 
valuing assets at book, estimating good will by multiplying 
average profit by 21;2, adjusting inventories to fair market 
value (replacement cost), adjusting capital assets by ad-
justing for the difference in accelerated depreciation and 
straight-line depreciation, and making such orther adjust-
ments as would reflect corrections from departures from 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
Appellant also argues that Vulcan has suffered losses 
since respondent's withdrnwal. Again there is not a line 
of evidence in rbhe record to support this assertion, nor for 
thrut matter the startling assertion that corporate losses 
are causally linked to respondent's withdrawal. Appellant 
also asserts that Markosian stands in breach of an employ-
ment contract, while at the same time arguing that rthe 
Agreement contemplated an employment contract which 
was never consummated (Appellant's Brief, page 16). At 
best this is a matter put in issue in one of the related cases 
which has not been proven. 
Ultimately the thrust of Appellant's argument is thaJt 
it is somehow unjust to permit Markosian to break a never 
consummated employment "contract" and aJt the same time 
recover the value of his investment. But this argument 
ignores the realities of the situation. In a close corporation 
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the invesltors usually contemplaJte that salary and other 
direct compensation will be the chief reward of their co-
operation. Mutual cooperation and trust are the keystones 
to success of close corporations. Once thaJt cooperaJtion and 
trust have evaporated, as happened here, the investors will 
wish to withdraw 1with their investment. The only way to 
secure thaJt end and promote the essential cooperation is to 
allow each investor the freedodm to get oult with the value 
of his investment. 
IV. THE APRIL 12 AGREEMENT .SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSTRUED AGAINST EITHER 
PARTY THERETO. 
A. The Agreement Was Negotiated. 
Regardless of the identity of the person who wrote the 
words now at issue, .the rule of § 559, Corbin, Contracts 
(1960), does not apply. In the first place the entire Agree-
ment was negotiated by the parties. The rule stated at I 
559 has its principal application to so-called "contracts of 
adhesion," or to oontracts the entire terms of which are 
drafted by one parity. Typical instances of the proper ap-
plication of this rule are contracts where there is great 
dispar.ity of bargaining strength, such as insurance policies, 
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 180 U. S. 
132, 45 L. Ed. 460 (1901); Prince v. Western Empire Life 
1ns. Co., 19 Utah 2d 17 4, 4:28 P. 2d 163, 166 ( 1967), and 
contracts like automobile franchise agreements. Buono 
Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 363 F. 2d 43 (3d Cir. 
1966). See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 
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N. J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69, 85 (1960); Loftin v. United States 
Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S. E. 2d 53, 58 (1960). 
Application of this rule would result in interpretation 
against Gerstner who, as reflected by the fact thart he se-
cured 51 per cent control and the presidency of tthe Cor-
poration, appears to have had bargaining superiori,ty. 
Appellant's argument that the Agreement should be 
construed against respondent is founded upon certain depo-
sition rtestimony given by respondent. This deposiition was 
filed in 1the District Court by the reporter, at that time 
being sealed, closed and bearing a notation that it was to 
be opened only by order of court. No such order of the 
court appears in the record. ·The record also is barren of 
any order for the publication of the deposition. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that rthe deposition was 
offered or received into evidence as contemplated by Rule 
26(d) of the Utah Rule.s of Civil Procedure. The record 
fails to show affirmatively that the deposition was before 
the District Court. If appellant 1seeks inclusion of the depo-
sition in the record, it has the burden of showing thart the 
deposition was before the District Court. If the deposition 
was not before the Distriot Court, jJt should not be consid-
ered here, even though tran.smitted to this Court by the 
District Court clerk. United States v. City of Brookhaven, 
134 F. 2d 442 (5th Cir. 1943); Belt v. Holton, 197 F. 2d 
579 (D. C. Cir. 1952); Worsham v. Duke, 220 F. 2d 506 
(6th Cir. 1955); Charles v. Judge & Dolph Ltd., 263 F. 2d 
864, 867 (7th Cir. 1959). See also Black & Yates, Inc. v. 
Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. 2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941); McKinney 
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V. Boyle, 404 F. 2d 632 (9th Cir. 1968); Creason v. Ameri-
can Bridge, 384 F. 2d 475, 478 (10th Cir. 1967); cf., 
Jaconski v. Avisun Corp., 359 F. 2d 931 (3d Cir. 1966). 
Not only is the deposi.Jtion not properly before this 
Court, but the testimony found therein and relied upon 
gives rise to the inference that respondent's counsel drew 
the entire agreemenlt in question. But as counsel for Vulcan 
well knows, such an inference would be false. Mr. Beesley, 
counsel for Vulcan and Gerstner, participated in the negoti. 
ation of the agreement and indeed exchanged prelimirrary 
drafts with respondent's couns1el and approved the final 
document himself on behalf of Mr. Gerstner. Conceding 
ithaJt there is Httle in the record* regarding Mr. Beesley's 
participation, respondent expects appellant's counsel to 
concede his participartion in a spirit of candor and fairness 
in order that this Court will not be misled on the facts. 
B. The Agreement is Unambiguous. 
In the absence of ambiguity there is no reason to con· 
strue the agreement against either party. "It is frequently 
said that this rule is to be applied only as a last resort. It 
should not be applied until other rules of interpretation 
have been exhausted; nor should it be applied unless there 
remain two possible and reasonable interpretaltions. The 
rule is hardly to be regarded as truly a rule of interpreta· 
tion ... It is chiefly a rule of public policy, generally favor· 
ing the underdog." Corbin, Contracts, § 559 at pp. 268-270 
----;;;.he District Court was informed that the April 12 Agreement 
was negotiated by and between both parties in respondent's memoran· 
dum filed in support of its motion (R., p. 126). 
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(1960). See Restatement, Contracts, § 236. Where, as 
here, a party makes a far-fetched claim of ambiguity in 
order to claim advantage of the rule contra proferentum, 
without offering evidence of the actual intenlt of the par-
ties, the Court .should afford him very little comfort. Mich-
igan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Carroll, 271 Ala. 404, 12'3 So. 2d 920 
(1960). 
As show in Part I of this Brief, the Agreement is un-
ambiguous, being susceptible Ito only one interpretation, 
that made by the District Court. 
V. THE APRIL 12 AGREEMENT IS AN IN-
TEGRATED CONTRACT. 
Appellant argues in its Bri'ef (pages 15 and 16) that 
the April 12 Agreement is not an integrated agreement 
and therefore parol evidence may be admitted to qualify it. 
Vulcan relies on the fact that the Agreement contemplated 
a furlher agreement relating rto employment of respondent. 
However, the Agreement was fully integralted as to the 
rights and obligations arising upon tmnsfer of shares, a 
completely independent provision, and hence the introduc-
tion of parol evidence as rto that portion is not permissible. 
Restaltement, Contracts, § § 232, 239; Smith v. Bear, 237 F. 
2d 79, 85 (2d Cir., 1956) (applying California law); Keeler 
V. Murphy, 117 Oal. App. 386, 387, 3 P. 2d 950 (1931); 
Schwartz v. Shapiro, 229 Cal. App. 2d 238, 40 Gal. Rptr. 
189, 197 ( 1964). 
Appellant's argument that parol evidence should be 
admitted to vary the terms of the Agreement fails on an-
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other score. Vulcan did not place in the record before the 
Districlt Court any such parol ewdence, despite an oppor. 
tunity to do so, and is not now in a pooirtion to assert such 
parol evidence. Neither the District Court nor this Comi 
has ever been informed of any parol ·evidence which would 1 
vary lthe language of the conltract. 
Appellant also asserts that merely because the partie.1 
now assert divergent interpretations of the contract is an 
indication lthat it is uncerttain or ambiguous. If .such were 
the case, any person who sought to avoid lthe most clearly 
expressed obligation would merely have to claim some fan. 
ciful interpretation of the obligation in order to produce 
evidence contrary Ito its plain !terms. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of itJhe District Courrt, determining that the 
Agreement of April 12, 1965, requires Vulcan to purchase 
respondent's stock, should be affirmed. The interpretation 
rendered below gives full effect to the parties' expressed 
intent, and is the only interpretation which takes into con· 
sideration lthe entire plan of 1'.1estrictions and obligations 
imposed upon tmnsf ers of stock. 
Respectfully 1submitted, 
WARREN PATTEN 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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AGREEMENT made and entered into rthis 12th day 
of April, 1965, by and between J. DEAN GERSTNER, 
hereinafter referred to as Gerstner, and ABRAHAM MAR-
KOSIAN, hereinafter referred to as Markosian. 
RECITALS: 
A. Markosian is the sole sitockholder in Vulcan S~l 
Corporation, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called Cor-
poration, which at present iis inactive. The only asset of 
Corporation is cash in the amount of $1,200.00. Corpora-
tion has no liabilities, actuaJ or contingent. 
B. Gerstner has heretofore been engaged in the steel 
manufacturing and selling business rbhrougih a corporation, 
Gerstner Steel Supply Company, Inc. 
C. Gerstner and Markosian are desirous of engaging 
in the business of steel fabricating and related activities, 
through Vulcan Steel Corporation. 
D. Gerstner and Markosian wish to be assured of a 
market at a fa:ir price for their shares of stock in Vukan 
Steel Corporation in the event their interest in Corporation 
is terminated for any reason. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants herein contained, rthe par:ties lhereto agree as 
follows: 
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1. Subscription for Stock. Markosian shall cause 
Corporation to acceprt a subscription for 805 shares of au. 
thorized capital stock of Vulcan Steel Corporation and shall 
cause Corporation to issue and deliver 505 shares as fo]. 
lows: 
(ia) 417 shares will he ,issued to Gerstner upon 
payment in ful[ of $41,700, by ibhe transfer to Corpora-
tion, free of all encumbrances, of steel inverubories, at 
rthe prices agreed upon by the parties, set forth in 
schedule A attached hereto and incorporaJted herein by 
reference. 
(b) 88 shares shall be issued rto Markosian upon 
payment by him to Corpora.ition of $8,800 fa oash. 
(c) Markosian subscribes to an additional 300 
shares of stock in Corporation for a !total consideration 
of $30,000, or a price of $100 per share, to be paid 
(i) $10,000 on or before May 1, 1965, and 
(ii) $20,000 on or before April 1, 1966. 
The shares of stock subject to this subscription shall 
be issued in proportionate amounts as the subscription 
price is paJid. At completion of the issuance of stock 
provided herein, Gerstner shall own 51 per cent of the 
outstanding stock of the corporation and Markosian 
shall own 49 per cent. 
2. Control. The parties shall vote rtheir stock so as 
to provide for the following: 
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(a) The directors shall be Gerstner, Markosian, 
and ------------------------------------------------------------------------· to serve 
until their successors are duly elected and qualified. 
(b) The officers shall be as follows: 
Gerstner President and Trea.surer 
Markosian Vice-President, General 
Manager and Secretary 
(c) The employment of Markosian as Vice-Pres-
ident, General Manager and Secretary of Corporation 
at a monthly salary of $800 per month, payable in 
equal semi-monthly installments, plus 5% of the net 
profits before taxes as shown on the federal income 
tax return, which amount shall be paid on or before 
March 15 of each year. Markosian shall devote his 
entire time and efforts to the affair.s of Corporation. 
Within thirty days after closing a written contract of 
employment shall be entered into by and between Cor-
poration and Markosian, and such contract shall pro-
vide, among other things that may be agreed upon be-
tween the parties, a five-year term of employment of 
Markosian, 'with an au'tomatic renewal on the part of 
Corporation for continuing one-year periods upon the 
same terms and conditions, unless Corporation notifies 
Markosian in writing within sixty day.s of the end of 
the term or any extension thereof of its intention to 
terminate such agreement, and such contract shall 
include provision for a car to be furnished to Markos-
~an and for an expense account covering normal travel 
and entertainment expenses incurred on behalf of Cor-
poration. 
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3. Restrictions on Sale of Stock. Neither of the par. 
ties hereto ,shall encumber or dispose of this 1stock except 
in accordance with the following rterms and conditions: 
(a) Transfer to Members of Family. Either 
party hereto may transfer all or part of his stock by 
gift to or for the benefit of himself or his spouse, or 
any linerul ancestor or descendant. In such case, the i 
transferee shall receive and hold such stock subject to 1 
the :terms of this agreement and to :the obligations 
hereunder of the transferor, and there ,shall be no 
.further transfer of such stock except by gift between 
members of such family or except in accordance with 
the Olther terms of this agreement. Such transfer shall 
be subject tto rthe further requirement that the trans· 
feree must agree in 'Writing prior :to rthe transfer that 
he will, alt rthe request of the other stockholders, file a 
consent by shareholder with the Internal Revenue Ser· 
vke, agreeing to an clection 'by Corporation to be taxed 
as a "small business corporation" under the provisions 
of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, or such 
other provisions of law now or hereafter applicable t-0 
such election. Tmnsfers tto members of families can· 
IllOt be made in such numbers as would render Corpora· 
tion ineligible to be .taxed under the Subchapter S pro- ' 
visions of the Internail Revenue Code or like provisions. 
'Dhis provision does not constitute an agreement by the 
parties hereto to elem to be taxed as a "small busine&l 1 
corporation." 
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(b) First Option to Purchase Stock. Except as 
provided in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph 3, no 
stockholder and no transferee who has received stock 
in accordance with the provisions of said subpara-
graph (a) shall encumber or dispose of all or any part 
of his or her stock in OorporaJtion, now owned or here-
after acquired by him or her, without 1:Jhe written con-
sent of all other stockholders. In the absence of such 
written consent, or at the request of ;the stockholder 
desiring to encumber or dispose of his or her stock, 
such stockholder shall give to Corporation and to the 
other stockholders written notice of his or her inlten-
tion, and such notice sha:ll contain an offer to sell aU 
of his or her stock in accordance with the terms of this 
agreement. The Corporation shall have thirty days 
from the date of the receipt of such notice with which 
to purchase the stockholder's stock. The purchase price 
of the stock offered for sale shall be in accordance with 
the provisions of subparagraph (c) of paragraph 3. 
In the event Corporation shall fail or refuse to pur-
chase such stock within the time herein provided, then 
the party desiring to sell or dispose of said stock shall 
be free to make any other disposition of it afforded or 
desired. 
( c) Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock 
Offered. At :tJhe termination of employment by Cor-
poration of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, it 
shaH be mandatory for CorporaJtion to purchase all of 
the stock of M'arkosian, Gemtner, or any stockholder 
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or rtransf eree giving written notice as herein provided 
of his or her intention :to dispose of his or her sitock. 
'Dhe purchase price .of ithe stock offered for sale shall 
be .its fair market va1ue alt 1Jhe date of the offer to sell 
) 
determined as follows : 
(i) The parties shall determine rthe value of 
the assets annually and such resultant sum soon 
be the tolbal sales value of the shares of stock of 
said corporation. In lthe evenlt the parties fail 1:-0 
establish the value of the assets on or before Jan. 
uary 15 of each year, then !the value of .the a&sets 
for that year Sihal[ be determined under subdivi-
sions (H), (ii~i), .and (iv) hereof. 
(ii) The aissets shall be valued ·at the book 
vaJlue rto be fixed by an immediaJte inventory 
thereof. 
(iii) The good wi:ll of said corporation shall 
be estimated by taking the yearly 1average profits 
during tthe previous five years and multiplying the 
same by21f2. 
(iv) The amount determined by adding the 
amounts of items (ii) and (iii) shall ibe adjusted 
by: 
(A) Inventories shal[ be increased W 
fair market value. (Fair market v;alue shall 
be defined for this purpose as replacement 
via:lue at lthaJt date for such irtJems when pur· 
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chased in quanltities normally purchased by 
the Corporation.) 
(B) Net book value of property planlt 
and equipment shall be adjusted by adding 
back the excess of accelerated depreciation 
over straight-line depreciation taken by Cor-
poration. 
( C) Any other iJtems wherein the ,ac-
counting treatment of transactions by Cor-
poration differs from generally accepted ac-
counting principles as determined by an in-
dependent certified public acoounitant. 
The purchase price determined herein shalll be 
paid in three equa:l insrflallmenlts, unless lthe selling 
stockholder notifies ,fue corporation in rwriiting of his 
desire to receive 29 per cent of the purchase price as 
the initial payment, with the first installmenlt payable 
within 15 days after the determination of the price and 
the other two installments Ito be made yearly on the 
same date in each succeeding year with interest 1at the 
raJte of 5 per cent on the un~id balance. Said purchase 
price shaH be determined not more than 45 days after 
the written offer to Corpol"ation by the selling stock-
holder. 
( d) If 1at the time Corporation is required to 
make payment of lthe purchase price its surplus is in-
sufficient for such purpose, then (1) stock to itJhe ex-
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tent of the entire available surplus shall be purchased I 
' I 
and (2) Corporation and the stockholder shall prompt i 
I 
ly take all required action to reduce the capital stock ' 
I 
of Corporation to ithe extent necessary for the redemp. 
tion of the unpurchased stock 1at the fair market value 
price determined 1as provided herein. If Corporation 1 
does not or is unable to reduce its capital Bfock, or by 
,any statutory provision or ruQe of 1aw is prevented 
from making the purcha;se of the stock offered for sale, 
then the remaining stockholders shal'l be jointly and 
severally obligated rto purchase the sitock 1at the de-
termined price. Each of s1aJid remaining stockholders 
shall be entitled to purcha.se a proportionate share of 
the stock offered for sale. The term "propoI'tionate 
share" shall mean :that portion of the stock of Corpora-
tion offered for ,sale which the stock of Corporation 
owned by each of the sitockh(jlders bears to rthe stock 
of Corpo:ria;tion (other lthan offered for sa;le) owned by 
aH stockholders. In addition, if any stock of Corpora· 
ti on offered for sale is not purchased by the stock· 
holder first entitled thereto, the iterm "proportionate 
share" shalil include tha;t portion of rthe stock of Cor· 
porati:on not purchased by the 1stockholder first entitled 
thererto, which the ,stock of Corporation owned by the 
stockholder bears to the stock of Corporation (other 
than offered for sale) owned by all stockholders other 
th!an the sitockholder first entitled to purcha.se. 
(e) Dual Notice. In the event both Markosian 
and Gerstner wish Ito terminate rtheir employment by 
Corporation, and desire to have Corporation purchase 
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their stock, the parties hereto agree to vote their sitock 
for the liiquidation and dissolution of Corpora1Jion. 
(f) Purchase and Sale of Stock upon Death of a 
Stockholder. Upon the death of any of rthe stockhold-
ers, all of the stock owned by him in Corporation at 
the time of his death and any stock 01wned by any 
transferee who shall receive s1tock from him in accord-
ance with :the provlisions of subparagriaph (a) of this 
paragraph 3 shaJll be offered or deemed to have been 
offered for redemption or sale by the legal representa-
tive of his estate and by any such transferee, wirthin 
ten days after qualifioation of such legal representa-
tive. Such stock shall 1be redeemed or. purchased in the 
manner provided by subparagraph (c) of this para-
.graph 3 at a price determined as provided therein, ex-
cept that the purchase price shall be pood in cash to the 
legal representative of his estate and for any such 
transferee. The parties hereto agree to vote their 
shares to have Corporation purchase a life insurance 
policy on each of their lives in an amount not less than 
------------------------ per cent of the net book va1ue of the 
total outstanding stock of Corporation at the end of 
each calendar or friscal year, wii'th the premium to be 
paid by Corporation, and Corporation to be named as 
benefiCiary, and rthe proceeds of such policies to be 
applied against !the purchase price or redemption of 
stock of the stockholder or his transferee. Said amounts 
of insurance shall be increased each year to lthe mini-
mum amount provrided herein, within 60 days after the 
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end of the ca:lendar or fiscial year to the exltenrt that the 
parties hereto are insurable. 
4. Termination of Restrictions on Dispositwn of 
Stock. Prows'ions restridtJing the sale of stock contained in 
thiis agreemenJt shall terminate upon the happell!ing of any 
of the following events : 
(a) The adjudication of Corporation as a bank-
rupt, the execution by it of any assignment for the 
benef1it of credli!tors or the appointment of a receiver 
for Corporation. 
(b) The invollunltary or volunltary dissolution of 
Corporation. 
5. Endorsement of Stock Certificates. The certifi· 
cates of srtock of Corpora!tion to be 1issued pur.suant :to the 
agreement sooll bear the foHowing endorsement : 
"The shares of stock reprosenlted by this cet!Jifi. 
cate are subject Ito all the terms of an agreement made 
April ____ , 1965, between J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham 
M1arkosian, a copy of which is on file alt the office of 
the corporation." 
6. Closing. The daJte of closing shtall be ·--·------------·······1 
1965, :alt which time fue shares of capital stock of Corpora· 
ltJion, subscrli:bed for by lthe parties hereoo, will be issued 
and delivered and the subscrip.tion price paid by each. The 
time of dlosing shaM be ---------------------·--• and the place of 
closing sha:H be the of fices of Fabian & Clendenin, Conti· 
nentba;l Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. Each of the 
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parties shall do all further acts and eXiecu:te all documenits 
thait may be necessary to the carrying out of this agree-
ment. 
7. Ratification of Agreement. The parties shall vote 
their stock so as to cause Corporation )to adopt and ratify 
all the terms of this agreement by resolution. A certified 
copy of this resolution shall be delivered to eac:h of the 
pa1'ties hereto. 
8. Notices. Any notices to be given under the terms 
of this agreement 'shall be in writing 'and addressed to Cor-
poration at its principal place of business, and any notices 
to be given to either of the individual partbies to this agree-
ment shall be addressed to them at their residences, or at 
such other addres.s as any of such parties may hereafter 
designate in writing to the others. Any such notice shall 
be deemed fully given when enclosed in a properly sealed 
envelope or wrapper addressed as herein required, certified 
and deposited (postage and ce:rlbi£i0ation fee prepaid) in a 
post office or branch posit office regularly maintained by 
the United States government in the continentrul United 
States. 
9. Benefit. T:hris agreemenlt shall survive rthe closing 
and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of Cor-
poration and the parties hereto, their respective successors 
and assigns. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, rthe parbies have execuited 
this 'agreement. 
/s/ J .. DEAN GERSTNER 
/s/ ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN 
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